



# THE BUMPER MONITOR

VOLUME 2 ISSUE NUMBER 1

FEBRUARY 2017

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## *THE UFUA AVIATION BRANCH NEWSLETTER*

In this edition:

- **FROM THE SECRETARY**
- **'ACCELERATE' HEADLINING FOR ALL THE WRONG REASONS.**
- **UFU LESSONS LEARNED NUMBER 6**
- **THE DIRD ARFFS REGULATORY REVIEW**

## 1. From the Secretary

Henry Lawrence

### Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery

Back on 8<sup>th</sup> November 2016 we began publishing a regular item in our newsletter titled “Lessons Learned.” This section in our newsletters is popular with not only members of the Aviation Branch but is also popular with members of the UFUA across Australia via our national magazine, “The Australian Firefighter.” In this edition of “The Bumper Monitor” we will be publishing “Lessons Learned Number 6” with numbers 7 and 8 ready for publication in future editions and already submitted to the editor of “The Australian Firefighter” for future editions of that publication.

In the March edition of “The Monitor” in Chat with the Chief it is interesting to note that ARFF are intending to do the same thing via “Major incident reviews [lessons learnt]. They say that *“imitation is the sincerest form of flattery”* so thanks for the compliment Chief.

### Blood testing PFAs

On a recent visit to Sydney CEO Harfield told our members that testing was available to staff who wanted to be tested and that he would talk to the EGM about the best contact person in ARFF.

On the 15<sup>th</sup> February our WHS Coordinator followed up on this with ARFF but didn’t get any confirmation that testing was available. At a meeting in Canberra on the 22<sup>nd</sup> February the Branch President and Branch Secretary raised the matter with ARFF representatives who said this wasn’t correct and that the CEO was misinformed or didn’t understand ARFF policy on the matter. On the 24<sup>th</sup> February the Branch Secretary sent the following email to the CEO:

**From:** branchsecretary@ufuav.asn.au [mailto:branchsecretary@ufuav.asn.au]  
**Sent:** Friday, 24 February 2017 9:14 AM  
**To:** 'jason.harfield@airservicesaustralia.com' <jason.harfield@airservicesaustralia.com>  
**Subject:** Blood testing [PFAA levels]  
**Importance:** High



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**ABN 96 533**

Good morning Jason,

Our Sydney members have told me that when you visited them at their station recently you indicated that anyone who wanted testing of the PFAA levels in their blood system could ask and AS/ARFF would pay for the testing.

Can you please confirm if this is the case and who they should be contacting to request to be able to access the testing?

Sincerely

Henry Lawrence  
Branch Secretary UFUA Aviation Branch

As no response had been received by the 3<sup>rd</sup> March, the Branch Secretary made the following further enquiry:

**From:** branchsecretary@ufuav.asn.au [mailto:branchsecretary@ufuav.asn.au]  
**Sent:** Friday, 3 March 2017 1:23 PM  
**To:** 'jason.harfield@airservicesaustralia.com' <jason.harfield@airservicesaustralia.com>  
**Subject:** FW: Blood testing [PFAA levels]  
**Importance:** High

Good morning Jason

I am just following up on my email to you on 24<sup>th</sup> February in regard to testing of PFA levels in our members blood system. Please refer to below.

Can you please confirm if our members are able to have their levels tested on request as indicated by at Sydney recently.

sincerely

Henry Lawrence  
Branch Secretary UFUA Aviation Branch

The response to this was a telephone call scolding the Branch Secretary for sending correspondence directly to the CEO but not direct answer to the question, “is testing available?”

It is evident that our persistence has paid off to the extent of ARFF saying in The Monitor issued on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March that they are now “looking closely at a number of options which may involve offering blood testing in the future. This means they are now reconsidering their position on this matter.

Understand that what was published in The Monitor under the title ‘THE FULL STORY ON PFAS’ is far from the full story and we will continue to pursue this issue with every means at our disposal.

### **EA negotiations getting under way**

As reported in our separate EA 2017 newsletters, negotiations for a new EA start next week on the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> March in Brisbane. The following week on 22<sup>nd</sup>, 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> March negotiations will be conducted in Melbourne.

The EGM said in the February edition of The Monitor that “the nature of the relationship with the Union will be key to a timely negotiation process that results in a successful outcome for you.” Why then would a member of the ARFF management team say to members that the Union is a toothless tiger and don’t bother them with any issues at the moment because they won’t want to be upsetting management before starting EA negotiations. That sort of statement is insulting and hardly conducive to a good relationship with you, who are the Union. We are treating that comment with the contempt it deserves. Your Union is constantly working on improving relations with ARFF, but as they say, it takes two to tango.

If you hear these sort of ridiculous comments on what your Union might or might not be doing just ignore them because management doesn’t have a clue about what your Union is doing. If you want

the facts on what is going on, contact your Station Organiser, Branch Committee of Management Delegate or the Union office.

## 2. 'Accelerate' headlining for all the wrong reasons.

### Airservices Australia insiders warn air-traffic job cuts are 'huge risk to public safety

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-15/air-traffic-job-cuts-putting-lives-at-risk-insiders-warn/8268360>

By the National Reporting Team's [Benjamin Sveen](#) and national technology reporter [Jake Sturmer](#)  
Updated 15 Feb 2017, 9:25am Wed 15 Feb 2017, 9:25am.

Job cuts have left the government body responsible for air-traffic control in Australia **in crisis**, with senior Airservices officials providing damning accounts that the organisation is **now "a huge risk to public safety"**.

#### Key points:

- Airservices staff fear it could take 'blood on their hands' before changes are made
- More than 700 jobs have been cut from the organisation to date as part of cost-cutting
- Senator Nick Xenophon is demanding an immediate cease of the retrenchments

"**It's only a matter of time** before we have a major aviation incident," one Airservices executive has told the ABC.

### Senator Nick Xenophon calls for investigation into Airservices Australia cuts

Posted 15 Feb 2017, 9:20am <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-15/senator-nick-xenophon-calls-for-investigation-into/8271874>

Senator Nick Xenophon sits on the Senate committee to which Airservices answers and is demanding an immediate stop to the organisation's retrenchments until an independent investigation has been conducted

<http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-service/union-fears-for-safety-as-airservices-cuts-up-to-one-in-five-jobs-20160715-gq6zfs.html>.

## 3. UFU Lessons Learned Number 6



### **Air France Airbus A340-313 (Flt AF358)**

**Aug 02, 2005 (16:02hrs) Pearson, Toronto, Ontario**

- Crew on board: 12
- Pax on board: 297
- Total fatalities: 0

There was heavy rain, lightning and poor visibility and the aircraft was on an ILS approach. Pilots of the preceding aircraft warned ATC of the poor braking action they experienced on landing. The aircraft touched down at the 1158 m mark on a 2740 m runway. Just under half way along. Unable to stop the Aircraft in the 1582 m remaining it left Runway at about 80 knots 150 kph and ended up in the Overshoot area runway 24L Toronto. Aircraft finally stopped in a ravine at 16:02 and caught fire.

All Passengers and Crew survived. 33 survivors were taken to hospital via ambulance.

Two Crew and 10 Passengers were seriously injured, however all injured passengers and crew were still able to evacuate.


The 2 seriously injured crew members still managed to perform their emergency duties effectively.

**The TSB Canada report alleged the Pilot and First Officer's actions and omissions directly caused this accident. Air France contested that it was the ATC (Nav-Canada, and the Greater Toronto Airport Authority's (GTAA) fault.**



### **TSB Canada Findings of Note to ARFFS**

- Pearson INTL Airport was designated **Category Nine** for ARFFS.
- ARFFS immediate response from the two Airport Fire Stations consisted of 15 staff (11 minimum crewing), one ICV, one RIV, two Urban Pumpers and four 12,000L Airport Fire Tenders.
- 8 Vehicles in total two with HRET capability.
- ARFFS first arriving was on scene one minute after crash alarm.
- Significant **Difficult Terrain Access issues** were encountered.
- Initial agent delivered **was 39,500 litres 63% above regulatory requirements.**
- More water was obtained from hydrants located at the airports bus terminal about a 1km away via **a vehicle shuttle.**
- Eventually a Fire Authority water tanker arrived to keep the ARFF vehicles on scene and operating effectively.
- Heavy Rain diluted the foam blankets (AFFF) **causing it to break down** and be less effective.
- It took approximately 1hr 40 mins after the crash before the Passenger manifest arrived and passenger numbers could be confirmed.
- L2 door opened by itself due to crash forces, the chute then failed to deploy.



- In 1978 a similar accident involving a DC9 occurred in the overshoot area of the Toronto Pearson INTL 24L (old runway).
- This resulted in two fatalities and 47 serious injuries.
- The Coroner examining this 1978 incident recommended immediate action to extend the RESA area and place a 300m causeway over the ravine. (It was rejected by the Greater Toronto Airport Authority GTAA due to cost)



Nearly three years after the 2005 A 340 crash, Air France attempted to sue the Greater Toronto Airports Authority (GTAA), which runs Pearson, as well as the Canadian government and Nav-Canada. Nav-Canada is the privatised agency in charge of air-traffic control in Canada. Air France is suing for \$180 million, claiming the runway the plane slid off lacks proper safety margins and did not meet international standards. Specifically, negligence that the GTAA did not enact the recommendations of the Coroner from the 1978 crash, there was no 300m run off area, there were no grooves in the runway to aid water runoff and traction and there were no arrestor beds to prevent an aircraft sliding into the ravine.

The Nav-Canada and GTAA defence is that they might not comply with ICAO but they comply with the Canadian Regulation. **Sound familiar?** Regulations that a cynic might suggest the GTAA helped formulate to reduce their costs rather than to increase safety.

A \$12 million plus Class action law suit on behalf of 184 passengers was settled which included \$10 mil from Air France, \$2 mil from the Airport and \$1.65 mil from Airbus and Goodrich the slide manufacturer. Nav-Canada and Air France also jointly contributed another \$7.1 mil in 2010. In 2011 the Class actions counsel for the class action claimants were also awarded costs of over \$6.2 mil. That's a lot of millions that could have bought a decent size arrestor bed or possibly grooved the runway in the first place.

**So what do UFU Members learn from this:**

1/ People with safety accountabilities should never be pressured into making decisions that are based purely on costs and not safety consequences. Why did these pilots choose to land when many others had already diverted to safer airports? Why did ATC keep this airport open when the weather was so bad? Why did the airport authority reject the Runway End Safety Area advice and knowingly choose to ignore ICAO recommendations regarding runway safety? Why does Airservices, CASA and DIRD promote and apply the same flawed logic of ignoring ICAO SARPS here in Australia?

2/ Are you relying on Shuttling Trucks to get water to the scene? Have you really considered in detail the practical and time implications of this strategy? Don't be fooled by the old don't get down in the weeds argument. You need to get down in the weeds and you need to take a magnifying glass with you when you are preparing for PPRR. (Prevention, Planning, Response, Recovery)

3/ Primarily Adelaide is our only real Cat 9 airport, 3 trucks on line and a crew of 2 + 8. Our stations at Cat 8 that use remission Coolangatta, Darwin and Cairns have the same vehicles but only 2+6 staff, to protect category 9 aircraft.

- So do you go to the closest hydrants?
- Do you know how much water you can get out of them? Have you checked lately?
- Do you go to the designated hydrants?
- How far are these hydrants from the runway ends?
- How long will it take for the Mk 8 to get there?
- How long to fill up? How long for the Mk 8 to get back?
- Do you follow the ARFFS driving SOP and have two staff return?
- How do you conduct rescue and control the critical area with only 4 firefighters left on a Cat 9 fireground?

4/ So Category 9 and 8 here with Mk8's have 26,700 litres on-board, as well as that we also have the known performance issues of F3 foams. This incident used nearly 40,000 litres just in the initial attack before crews starting to shuttle vehicles for water. The question that should be asked by any safety focussed operations authority is **do we have enough agent on board to actually do the job?** Is that assessment based on research of real aircraft incidents or is it just the minimum agent ARFFS can get away with and not be charged as negligent?

5/ What happens when decisions are not being made with real operational knowledge and depth of understanding is the Canadian situation and defence of 'but we met the minimum regulations required in this country'.

6/ Have you really conducted a proper assessment of all the difficult terrain access on your airports or only the wedge? Wherever it crashes on the airport you will still be expected to attend and operate effectively.

7/ Flight attendants and crew are on-board the aircraft when it crashes. Is it wise to think they will always be fully capable of supporting the evacuation and mustering the survivors to a safe area? In this case 2 were seriously injured.

<http://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/air-france-flight-358-crash/>

<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/air-france-settles-flight-358-class-action-suit-1.854222>

<http://www.citynews.ca/2008/06/04/air-france-sues-gtaa-ottawa-over-2005-crash-at-pearson/>

[https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2008/06/04/air\\_france\\_sues\\_over\\_crash.html](https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2008/06/04/air_france_sues_over_crash.html)

<http://www.cfmlawyers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Air-France-Nav-Canada-Statement-of-Defence.pdf>

<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/10/31/transport-canada-dragging-its-feet-on-addressing-safety-risks-watchdog.html>

## 4. The DIRD ARFFS Regulatory Review:

### Introduction

On 18 December 2015, the Department Infrastructure and Regional Development (DIRD) released a regulatory policy review consultation paper that considered future arrangements in relation to the provision of ARFFS at Australian airports. Public and industry comments on the paper closed on 12 February 2016. Eleven submissions were received, from the following entities:



Airservices Australia



Australian Airports Association



Ayers Rock Airport



Board of Airlines Representatives of Australia Inc



International Air Transport Association



Qantas



Regional Aviation Association of Australia



Regional Express



The Administration of Norfolk Island



United Fire Fighters Union of Australia Aviation Branch



Virgin Australia

In December 2016, the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, the Hon Darren Chester MP announced the outcomes of the ARFFS Regulatory Policy Review.

**Summary of the Review:**

Recommended amendments to the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) Subpart 139.H and Manual of Standards:

ARFFS to be established at a location where a trigger event occurs and where the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) decides, following a risk review, that ARFFS is required at that location. The establishment triggers for a risk review are:



Scheduled international passenger air services, or



500,000 passengers on scheduled commercial air services P/A.

ARFFS is disestablished when a trigger event occurs and where CASA decides, following the conduct of a risk review **by the ARFFS provider** that ARFFS is no longer required.

Disestablishment triggers for a risk review are:



Withdrawal of scheduled international passenger air services, or



Passenger on scheduled commercial air services falling below 400,000 P/A.



CASA and the ARFFS provider to consult with industry, **the public** and relevant government agencies during the conduct of risk reviews.



CASA must complete a risk review for establishment of an ARFFS within six months of a scheduled international passenger air services approved to commence operating at an airport. Or when the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE) confirms 500,000 passenger's P/A trigger has been met at an airport.

An ARFFS provider must complete a risk review within six months of the withdrawal of scheduled international passenger air services or the BITRE confirming passenger numbers below 400,000 P/A. Where an establishment risk review decides that ARFFS is not required, CASA will monitor activities to determine whether a further risk assessment is required. If numbers continue to be above 500,000 P/A or scheduled international passenger air services continue a further risk review is to be undertaken. A risk review should be undertaken if significant changes of safety risk factors occur. Where the risk review decides ARFFS is required at a location, CASA in consultation with the ARFFS provider, will determine the timeframe for establishment.

CASA may permit a graduated service prior to the establishment of full ARFFS operations. A graduated service could include the initial provision of ARFFS at a category lower than the services required. Alternatively, other measures including the training of the local fire brigade, and the provision of personnel and firefighting equipment.

Where the risk review indicates that ARFFS should remain at the location, and twelve months after CASA's decision, passenger numbers remain below the disestablishment trigger or does not receive a scheduled international passenger air service, further risk review should be undertaken by the ARFFS provider and decision made by CASA.

In transitioning to the new arrangements, **it would not** be necessary to undertake a disestablishment risk review relating to **an existing ARFFS** unless the total number of passengers falls below the existing disestablishment threshold of **300,000** P/A.

A "fire-fighting related service" provided at an airport that is not required to have an ARFFS under the CASR is not an "ARFFS" within the meaning of the CASR. A "firefighting related service" could still be provided at an airport but would not be subject to the regulatory framework or regulation by CASA.

ARFFS are for areas or facilities which are used or intended to be used for aviation activities and activities closely connected with aviation activities; including: taxiways, runways, aprons, airside roads, airside grounds and aircraft parking areas; airside freight handling and staging areas; air traffic control towers; airport terminals; and aircraft hangars, on-airport maintenance facilities and aviation fuel storage/refuelling facilities.

Aviation-related infrastructure may be identified as such in an agreement (Memorandum of Agreement) between ARFFS and fire authorities. Agreements should be developed in consultation with the airport owner/operator.

Fire authorities are not required to hold separate CASA approval to assist an ARFFS provider in the provision of ARFFS under an agreement with ARFFS.

The airport operator facilitates the provision of ARFFS and are required to facilitate the provision of: access to on airport utilities to meet service delivery requirements; adequate facilities for rapidly replenishing water supply; emergency roads capable of supporting ARFFS vehicles; crash gates for off airside access; regular communication about the provision of ARFFS at the airport, and access to a reasonable area on the airport for storage, training and other ARFFS related uses.

Prescriptive requirements relating to training and equipment provisions be replaced with a more systems and outcomes-based approach supported by the regulatory requirement for the ARFFS provider to establish a safety management system which is approved and audited by CASA.

### **Conclusion:**

The UFUA Aviation Branch tried very hard to prevent this travesty of a regulatory review from proceeding. It appears that our efforts may have saved the ARFFS at those airports that don't currently meet the 400k disestablishment threshold. Our letters to CASA, the Minister, Comcare & all Australian MHRs and Senators asking for support along with our **Three Minutes to Live** campaign may have been responsible for preventing a total disaster.

But there are still significant dangers to our members in these changes. We believe there are issues with Airservices Risk work is when it comes to ARFF. Airservices cannot be trusted to meet the requirements of the Regulations now and the number of CASA exemptions is testimony to this. So, if they can't their current obligations, what is going to happen with a more relaxed regulatory framework?

Providing an ARFFS at a lower category as a graduated service, in our view, shows how little the authors of these regulations know about ARFFS. If you don't have the agent required, you can't put out the fire. If you don't have the staff required you can't operate in a safe and effective manner, as per the SOP's. Passengers and ARFF staff will be put at greater risk again but at least Airservices will have saved some money.

## **5. Members Corner:**



This little champion is Brisbane LAFF Mitchell Hill's son: Hendrix Roscoe Hill. Born 17:04 on Valentine's Day. That was the 14<sup>th</sup> of Feb for all you unromantic types. Hendrix weighed in at 3.8kgs (8lbs 6oz) and was delivered via C Section. Feeds and Farts like his dad (which is top of the class) according to his Fire Commander. All three are doing well.

## **6. WHAT THE DUCK???**



On the 27<sup>th</sup> January 2017 ARFF Brisbane had a very unusual turnout. Tender 6 (DRV) responded to a fire-line call from a member of the public. Upon arrival on scene they found a family of ducks had managed to get themselves trapped in a drain. The crew comprised of SO Dave Wood, LFF Lachlan Argus and LFF Edward Ekkelenkamp.

The closed drain going under the road presented a substantial hazard making our boys think of an elegant solution. Utilising a branch at low pressure on one end of the drain to float and push the ducks to the other end, where they could be scooped up and put in a bucket. LFF Eddie Ekkelenkamp being the branch man and LFF Lachie Argus being the duck wrangler.

In all, eight ducklings were rescued to the relief of concerned onlookers.

LFF Argus (left) and LFF Ekkelenkamp (right) each holding one of the saved ducklings (names unknown).

**A Ducky Escape!**